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CRITICAL NOTES ON THE COST OF CRIME
E. R. HAWKINS and WILLAR WALLER*
A considerable literature on the cost of crime is already extant.
Much of this literature is wholly fallacious. Most of it is misleading
in its general implications. Only a very small part of it is written
with any conception of the methodological difficulties inherent in the
problem. It is strange that so many pages of printed matter should
have been produced with suclh a small expenditure of reflective
thought. It is the purpose of the present paper to test the
truth of some of the premises of this literature by economic analysis
and to point out a new direction of investigation.
Estimates of the annual "cost of crime" in the United States
have ranged from a few hundred millions to nice round sums like
thirteen billions or eighteen billions of dollars. The conclusion seems
justified that no very well defined procedure has yet been developed
for making such estimates. As Dorr and Simpson say:
The estimates vary enormously, and appear in most cases to be either
mere guesses, or else simply repetitions of estimates made by others which,
in turn, were guesses. In no case is there any thorough analysis of the
elements of the cost of crime, and there is a considerable tendency to add
together all sorts of costs related to crime without considering whether
such procedure is permissible.'
The Dorr and Simpson Report
The most completely thought out discussion of the cost of crime
is the Report on the Cost of Crime and Criminal Justice in the United
States, prepared for the National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement by Dorr and Simpson. Dorr and Simpson carefully
distinguish between individual and social costs of crime, or, as they
put it, between immediate and ultimate costs. The ultimate cost of
crime is the economic loss to the community as a whole as a result of
crime, and is measured by the difference between our present na-
tional income and the income we should have were there no crime.-
The immediate cost of crime is the aggregate burden on the in-
*Pennsylvania State College.
'Dorr, Goldthwaite, H., and Simpson, Sidney P.: Report on the Cbst of
Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States; prepared for the National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement; p. 466.
21t is perhaps not overly pedantic to remark that this statement presupposes
that we regard the criminal as a member of society,
[679]
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dividual members of the community as a result of crime. Dorr and
Simpson have elaborated this distinction with the utmost clarity:
In general, it may be said that expenditures or losses which involve
merely transfers of money or property form part of the immediate cost of
crime, but are not, at least in their entirety, part of the ultimate cost to the
community. In this class fall public expenditures for the administration
of criminal justice, private expenditures for protection against crime, losses
due to criminal acts other than those due to crimes against the person or
involving the actual destruction of or injury to property, expenditures for
insurance against crime, expenditures for the support of indigent de-
pendents of prisoners. Expenditures of this character impose a burden
on the property-owning and tax-paying portion of the community; but,
while in most instances the amount of that immediate burden is measured
by the sum total of such expenditures and losses, the amount so expended
or lost does not necessarily measure an ultimate loss to the community.-
Dorr and Simpson understand that:
These two aspects of crime are for the most part mutually exclusive.
The elements of the ultimate cost of crime are not, in general, elements
of the immediate cost of crime, and the converse is also true. The ultimate
cost of crime, for example, includes losses due to the uneconomic use of
the potential productive labor of criminals and law enforcement officers,
but does not include transfers of money or other property from injured
individuals to persons engaged in criminal activities. 4
It seems obvious enough, in view of this distinction, that the
immediate cost of crime to individuals and its ultimate cost to the
community are incommensurable. If Thomas A. Edison had taken
up petty swindling in his youth, he might have succeeded in extracting
only a few thousand dollars from the public, but the ultimate cost
would have been enormous. Dorr and Simpson are likewise well
aware of double counting which arises from the failure to distinguish
between immediate and ultimate costs of crime. They note that:
it would obviously be improper to include both the public cost of admin-
istration of criminal justice and the potential amount that enforcement
officers could earn in other more directly productive occupations as ele-
ments of the economic cost of crime to the community.5
That is, it would be improper because the social income would be
increased only by the amount that the present enforcement officers
would produce if released for productive labor, not by this amount
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In this connection, it should be noted that if. the loss of productive
labor of prisoners is to be regarded as an element in the cost of crime to
the community, amounts expended for the support of dependents of prison-
ers can not be so regarded.8
The same reasoning holds here as was noted above.
Very few popular writers have grasped the meaning of this dis-
tinction, nor have all those who have written texts in criminology
made the most of it. Perhaps the worst offender is Ettinger, who
accepts without criticism the work of a writer in the Manufacturer's
Record; this writer estimates the "Federal State and municipal police
and prison budget" at $1,000,000,000 and then, under the heading
"Waste of Crime," includes "500,000 policemen at $1,500 a year"
(apparently the value that these men might have produced if they
had not been forced to spend their lives in -fighting crime), a total
of $750,000,000. He includes both of these figures in his grand total
of nearly $13,000,000,000.7 Again, Ettinger quotes figures apparently
taken from the Dorr and Simpson volume; he has compiled a table in
which he includes both insurance against crime and insured losses; he
then draws a line and adds.8 Some other text writers have been more
guarded, but have not given any really convincing evidence that they
understand the problems involved.
One specific criticism of the Dorr and Simpson volume may be
made at this point. They appear to have made a minor error in their
discussion of the cost of insurance against crime. They say:
From the standpoint of the individual who purchases such insurance,
the premium he pays is an immediate economic detriment which he volun-
tarily suffers because of the benefit he receives by receiving the insurance
company's contract of indemnity. He is out of pocket the amount of the
premium, and this, to him, is a financial loss; but he suffers no added
financial loss if the risk insured against occurs and he is indemnified by
the insurance company for the loss of his property. From his standpoint,
the insurance premium is a cost of crime-or rather a cost due to the pos-
sibility of a crime.9
This much is correct. But Dorr and Simpson continue the discussion
with this strange statement:
From the standpoint of. all insured individuals as a group, the net loss
due to crime is, of course, the total premiums less losses indemnified.10
6lbid., p. 63.
'Ettinger, Clayton J.: The Problem of Crime, p. 11.
sIbid., p. 13.
9Dorr and Simpson, op. cit., p. 413.
lOlbid., loc. cit.
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This is manifestly erroneous. It could be said that the net expense
incurred-by the insured group for the insurance itself,.that is, for the
service of having the losses spread over the group, is the amount of
premiums paid less losses indemnified, i. e., the loading, but the loss
due to crime for this group is simply the amount of gross premiums
paid. A single example will make this clear. Individuals A, B, C, D,
and E have each paid a premium of fifty dollars to a theft insurance
company. They have accepted a voluntary loss of two hundred and
fifty dollars. During the period covered, A suffers a loss of one
hundred dollars, and D a loss of seventy-five dollars. If Dorr and
Simpson's statement is accepted, the loss due to crime would be two
hundred and fifty dollars, less one hundred and seventy-five dollars,
or seventy-five dollars. Actually, this is the contribution to the ex-
pense of operating the insurance company;" the company pays the
claims, and the insured individuals have suffered at the end of the
year a total loss of two hundred and fifty dollars which they paid
in as premiums.
The Ultimate Cost of Crime
For Dorr and Simpson the concept of the ultimate cost of crime
remains fairly vague. Any estimate of ultimate cost would involve
an estimate of national income as. it would be if there were no crime;
since this estimate is impossible, they do not adumbrate the implica-
tions of the concept. J. M. Clark, in analysing the cost of the World
War, found that even for a unique event of this nature, definitely
located in time, a projection of trend would not yield a satisfactory
estimate of what the national dividend would have been had there
been no war.1 When one attempts to visualize just what this ulti-
mate cost of crime is and what it means, he is led to conclude that
the notion is little more than an absurdity. Sutherland appears to
be 'almost of this opinion:
Estimates have been made that the total financial cost of crime both
direct and indirect, is more than ten billion dollars a year. The estimates
of the financial cost are based principally on guesses. In addition, they
start with the questions, How much would be saved if no crimes were
committed and no precautions had to be taken against future crimes? This
hypothetical situation could not exist if everything else except crime re-
mained constant. In order to bring about a crimeless state of society it is
possible that the annual expenditure would need to be greater than the
expenditure for crime at present.-
"Clark, J. M.: The Cost of the World War to the American People.
"2Sutherland, E. H.: P-inciples of Criminology, p. 21.
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It may be noted that the correct economic adjustment would in-
volve the expenditure of resources in the suppression of crime only
up to the point at which the marginal expenditure would equal the
marginal reduction in cost of crime.
It is necessary to understand what is meant by the somewhat
vague term "cost." To the classical economist cost represented and
was measured by subjective disutility. At bottom, cost arose from
the pain of labor (and, later, abstinence). Rent was not included
in cost because it was felt that land can suffer no pain in producing
its utilities. Although this notion of cost persists in some economics
text-books, its premises were cut away from underneath it with the
collapse of hedonistic psychology. As a purely philosophic view of
cost, it may be permissible; for any computation of market costs in
an exchange economy, it is useless. There is no zero point on a
pleasure-pain scale. The terms themselves are entirely relative. Cost
is in essence a relative concept. Most men would work for a great
deal less than they receive, if there were no alternatives. In the
modern theory of "alternative costs," cost emerges because of a
competition of alternative uses for limited economic resources. Any
appraisal of costs must, therefore, be made in the light of alternative
uses for the economic resources. The cost of crime, ultimately, is
not the financial value of the goods and services absorbed by it, or
the subjective value of these goods and services, but simply the addi-
tional goods and services that could be obtained if there were no crime.
Let us take one element of the ultimate cost of crime, the loss of
productive labor, and see what is implied in the discussion. Criminals,
convicts, policemen, guards, sheriffs, insurance men, etc., all occupy
themselves with crime in some way. If there were no crime, the
argument runs, they could expend their efforts in productive labor
and could contribute to the welfare of society by increasing the social
income. To this proposition, two comments should be made. First,
how many criminals are, because of their physical and mental equip-
ment, unemployable in any society? Second, could they find a means
of expending their labor productively? The only justifiable con-
clusion is that they could do so only under a rather rigidly limited set
of conditions. An expanding nation, like the United States of a few
decades back, could absorb and utilize an unlimited supply of man
power. A communistic society might possibly find a use for these
extra men. But if these ex-criminals and ex-policemen were thrown
on the labor market of the United States at the present time, they
would have to be supported by relief, and would contribute little to the
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social income. The concept of the ultimate cost of. crime depends
upon the assumption of something like a perfect utilization of man
power, or, more accurately, upon that perfect and pure competition
that exists only in the logical categories of economic theory. Un-
doubtedly, there would exist a tendency towards the productive em-
ployment of these men in the long run. However, "the long run"
may be defined as any length of time that is required for the realiza-
tion of the ideals of perfect- mobility and rationality, and is a logical
rather than an historical category. In the light of these considerations,
it may fairly be questioned whether such a perfect economic system
has any value in a realistic determination of the cost of crime.
Some Crime Economically Productive
An assumption underlying discussions of the ultimate cost of
crime, frequently explicitly present in the discussion, is that labor
of criminals and of those who are paid to struggle against criminals
is lost to "productive" labor. Many more or less eloquent pass'ages
from the pens of leading criminologists could be quoted to this effect.
Nowhere does one find a statement of the fact which is very clear
to the economist, that the distinction between crime and "productive"
labor is a moral and not an economic distinction. 3 The economist
is not supposed to allow moral considerations to intrude themselves
into his analyses. He may not approve of advertising, he may not
approve of sub-marginal farms, he may not approve of sweatshop
labor, he may not approve of the life which human beings must lead
"back of the yards" because of large-scale meat-packing, but he is
not supposed to allow such considerations to enter into his analyses
of the process of production and utilization of goods and services.
The sober economist is therefore obliged to point out that much crime
is economically productive. The prostitute, the pimp, the peddler of
dope, the operator of the gambling hall, the vendor of obscene pic-
tures, the bootlegger, the abortionist, all are productive, all produce
goods or services which people desire and for which they are willing
1aThis distinction between economic and moral considerations has been hard-
won even among economists. John Stuart Mill, in his Principles of Political
Economy, i, 3, sec. 5, said:
"The annual consumption of gold lace, pineapples, or champagne, must be
reckoned unproductive, since these things give no assistance to production, nor
any support to life or strength, but what would easily be given at less cost."
In the Eighth Edition of his Principles of Economics, 1920, Alfred Marshall
made a considerable concession to the exclusion of ethics from economics.
"It is true that all wholesome enjoyments, whether luxuries or not, are
legitimate ends of action, both public and private; and it is true that the enjoy-
ment of luxuies affords 4n incentive to exertion, and promotes progress in
many ways" (p. 66). But note the word "wholesome"!
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to pay. It happens that society has put these goods and services
under the ban, but people go on producing them and people go on
consuming them, and an act of the legislature does not make them any
less a part of the economic system.
Reasoning based upon this false distinction sometimes leads to
ridiculous misapprehension of economic concepts. "Our national in-
come," remarks a popular orator, "is only seventy billion, and if we
spend ten billion for crime, that leaves only sixty billion for legitimate
industry." Criminologists do not fall into this error, and yet there is
some reason to believe that it underlies some of their reasoning. Ob-
viously the national income is not expended in that way. In estimat-
ing what the automobile industry produces annually, one takes the
sum of money expended for automobiles as a measure of the value
produced by the industry, and says that the industry contributed so
much to the national income. We must treat economically productive
crime in the same way. The sums of money diverted to bootleggers
must be added to the national income, not subtracted from it.
Crime and Economic Waste
It is usually taken for granted that enormous wastes are con-
nected with crime. It does not seem possible to question the truth
of the statement, but a careful anlysis of the relation of crime to
economic waste, and of the meaning of this waste in our economic
system, has been wanting hitherto. The interrelations of law, crime,
and waste are very complex and it is not easy to frame an ordered
conception of them. There are many kinds of waste and they im-
pinge upon the law in different ways. Waste may. be defined as a net
loss of utilities, which may be brought about by a destruction of
utilities or by creation of utilities with a greater expenditure of eco-
nomic resources than would be necessary whether under this economic
system or another. Four general statements may be made: 1. Many
crimes involve destruction of utilities. 2. Some crimes cause wastes
that have been specifically outlawed. 3. Some crimes effect saving of
wastes required by law. 4. Some crimes effect a saving of the wastes
of competition.
1. Physical destruction of property frequently occurs because
of the haste and irresponsibility of the criminal. For example, a box-
car thief may carelessly damage much of the contents of the car. A
safe-cracker may ruin a five thousand dollar safe to obtain a few
hundred dollars. Such destruction is a loss to society and to the
individual owner, and is not even partially. offset by a gain to the
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criminal. Similarly, stolen goods frequently suffer a shrinkage of
value even though not physically destroyed. The value of a car is
lessened by the common practice of car thieves of "stripping" the
car and selling the parts. Stolen goods are frequently put to a lower
use than that intended, with a consequent shrinkage in value.',
2. In the cases noted above waste is incidental to the crime.
Some actions, however, are criminal because they violate specific
laws against certain types of waste. Waste of natural resources and
wild life has come within the jurisdiction of law through regulations
aiming at conservation. Some of the New England states have found
it desirable to conserve the lobster business by making it illegal to
retain lobsters of less than a certain size. This regulation has been
to the advantage of lobster men and has been for the most part
observed. Yet there has grown up a flourishing illegal business in
"short lobsters."
Again, illegal oil drilling is a crime that presents the curious-pic-
ture of restoring a waste that has been outlawed. The same may be
said of violations of the fish and game laws. Violations of the N. R.
A. codes' provisions against wasteful methods of competition may
also be cited, if convictions are upheld by the higher courts in cases
now pending.
3. Contrariwise, some crimes effect a saving of wastes that are
required by law. A certain mine is operated to remove and put on
the market a one-foot vein of coal. In mining this coal it is neces-
sary to cut out and throw away a much larger vein which cannot be
put on the market because it is below the ash fusion point required by
the state law. Otherwise this is excellent coal; it might be used for
domestic purposes, .would be mined very cheaply, etc. It can never
be mined now, according to experts. This is a waste required by law,
avoided by the crime of "coal bootlegging." Bribery of police offi-
cials to evade the requirements of ordinances is sometimes cheaper
than compliance. Presumably some social end is served by the ordi-
nance, and the social loss of the evasion may be greater than the
individual gain of the briber. Yet it is to be suspected that many
ordinances are enacted that do not serve social ends commensurate
,with the cost involved, and that some of them even have been passed
to create opportunity for "shake-downs." It may conceivably be
argued that such ordinances themselves constitute crimes, and that the
U'Such shrinkage, however, can be assessed only in terms of lowered market
value, if the goods are resold. Even though the criminal uses the solen goodsdarelessly or assigns them *to lower uses, he may derive greater utility from
them than the original owner.
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cost of complying with them or evading them alike is a cost of crime;
such a view would involve a conception of crime that would be
acceptable to the welfare economist but rather novel to the penologist.
4. Some criminal activity illegally effects a saving by reducing
the wastes of competition. In the main, our automatic economic
mechanism relies upon the self-interest of producers and consumers
to achieve maximum utilization of economic resources. Yet social
waste may follow from the self-seeking activity of individuals. In
our individualistic economy these wastes inherent in competition
have not been subjected to much regulation until comparatively re-
cent times. Indeed, in the endeavor to enforce free competition,
government has forbidden business men to regulate competition for
the reduction of wastes. Some of the most conspicuous wastes in-
volved in free competition are duplication of capital equipment, cross-
hauling, and competitive selling effort. Many associations and com-
binations of producers have had as their purpose, at least in part,
the reduction of these wastes. Thus, the American Malt Company
effected a saving in salaries and cross-freights, the United States
Leather trust effected savings by using bark lands nearest the various
plants, the American Tobacco trust spent far less in advertising than
the constituent companies after dissolution, the whiskey and sugar
trusts saved by closing some plants and running the others continu-
ously and to capacity. Examples could be multiplied. Yet most of
these trusts and associations have been declared illegal, in violation
of the Sherman Act.
Other business men have sought to eliminate the wastes of com-
petition by less formal and more clearly criminal methods. Dorr and
Simpson have observed that racketeers frequently do not force them-
selves upon business but are invited by business itself.15
In an earlier study, Landesco says:
The racketeer does not always impose himself upon an industry or an
association. He is often invited in because his services are welcome.' 6
This fact suggests that the racketeers are in reality performing
some kind of valuable function. That function is in part the reduc-
tion of the wastes of competition. It has long been recognized that
unrestrained competition may not be the life of trade, but the death
of trade. Our economic system, having as its keystone the legal
guarantee of the freedom of contract and individual enterprise, makes
25 Dorr and Simpson, op. cit., p. 410.
16 Landesco, John: The Illinois Crime Survey; Part III, Organized Crime
in Chicago, p. 982.
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possible in many fields a continual influx of aspiring entrepreneurs
possessed of little capital and vast ignorance. Not knowing their
costs, such entrepreneurs are frequently price-cutters selling below
their true total prime and supplementary costs. True, they are ulti-
mately forced out of business, thousands of them annually. But there
are always others to take their places. The net result is that there
are always sufficient numbers of such entrepreneurs to dislocate and
disorganize the industry. -Their operations result in a net social
loss, even though they sell at lower prices, because the economic re-
sources employed by them are true costs that must be paid by some-
body. They unproductively lose their own capital, and when they are
finally forced out of the field they typically leave behind them credit
losses that become part of the cost of doing business of those who
supply them. . . . It is no coincidence that the rackets have been
most significant in those fields that are most harassed by entrepreneurs
of this sort by reason of their easy access to those of small capital
and competence. Witness the rackets in the fields of laundry, clean-
ing and dyeing, drug stores, grocery stores, etc. Nor is it a coinci-
dence that the gunmen are often associated with the larger and more
substantial business men in these fields. These are business men who
have large capital investments to protect, who intend to cover their
costs and stay in business.17 A dictatorship of force is set up to impose
upon competitors a schedule of prices at which they must either cover
their costs and permit others to do so, or be driven out of business by
the loss of their price appeal. In the distribution of milk the same ef-
fect has been achieved by regulations necessitating expensive equip-
ment. These regulations, fostered by big distributors, discourage
small distributors from entering the field. An interesting parallel is
found in the fact that chief support of the N. R. A. dictatorship of
17Landesco's comment is particularly revealing. He says: "The Chicago
Iaundry Owners' Association, doing finished work, has always opposed these
little fellows who can start up with nothing." (Landesco, John, op. cit., p. 983.)
Again, we read: "The Chicago Hand Laundry Owners' Association are
'little fellows' who send their work to large wet wash'laundries and upon return
iron it, return it to the customer and collect. They do a 'drop' trade, which
means that the customer drops his bundle at their store and comes in to get it.
This organization was originally formed by Hirschie Miller as an aid in organ-
iging the inside laundry workers. In this instance Gorman was not invited in,
but the Laundry Owners' Association sent him to take these 'little fellows' in
hand, relieving Hirschie Miller. But Gorman has not worked to the entire satis-
faction of the Laundry Owners' Association, because he has permitted new
'little fellows' to start as long as they did not open places of business too near
association members. He was always partial in designating wet wash laundries
to receive work from those 'little fellows' to the exclusion of certain other wet
wash laundri'es. He then permitted a group of hand laundrymen to establish a
* new wet wash laundry (a new competitor for the 'big fellows'). In this new
laundry he took a fair size amount of stock as his share." (Ibid., pp. 984-985.)
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prices and costs is given by the largest and most highly capitalized
businesses. The analogy may be pursued further. In a sense the
N. R. A. also represents the use of compulsion for the purpose of
controlling the disorganizing forces of unrestrained competition. "
A case similar to the one outlined above is to be found in the
familiar circumstance of too many enterprises in a given field or
locality, none of them cutting prices below costs, but all of them
operating at unduly high cost by reason of spreading their overhead
over too small a volume of sales. The overhead of each one of these
enterprises is a cost which must be borne by the consuming public. A
socialistic society would immediately eliminate such needless duplica-
tion. It is conceivable that the racketeer may produce the same
beneficent effect by the use of his bombs and intimidations. A fre-
quent clause in the code of racketeering ainmis at a restriction of the
number of enterprises in the field and a prohibition of new enter-
prises. The result is a greater sales volume for the remaining enter-
prises, which enables them to allocate less overhead to each unit of
sales, and provide for the racketeer's tribute and their own usual
profits without raising the price to consumers.
It is interesting to note that in this case competition would pro-
duce the same effect if it worked perfectly. The theory of pure
competition contemplates no such waste as is involved in the observed
fact of needless duplication of stores and other enterprises. In the
theory of pure competition, any one enterprise could immediately
gain all the business of its rivals by a slight reduction in prices. Price
competition would continue until there would remain in each field
only enterprises operating at the size of greatest efficiency and lowest
average cost. The reason that this does not happen is that competi-
tion is not actually pure, but is tinged with monopoly elements. Each
seller who has a trade mark, or a place of business different from
others by reason of its location, atmosphere, or personality is a mo-
nopolist in the sense that he is the only one selling precisely that
bundle of utilities. His customers cannot be taken from him en masse
by a slight price differential. Instead, varying numbers of customers
would shift at different prices, depending upon the degree of con-
sumer preference. This is just another way of saying that the seller
can dispose of different quantities at different prices, instead of an
unlimited quantity at the market 'price and none above the market
price, as would be the case in pure competition. It is to these mo-
nopolistic elements that we must attribute the excessive number of
enterprises, each with its own more or less loyal clientele.
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Shifting and Incidence of the Cost of Crimne
Such fragmentary examinations of the shifting- and incidence
of the cost of crime as have been made are rather unsatisfactory.
Dorr and Simpson, for example, say:
The racketeer exacts tribute from his immediate victims, and in some
cases the matter ends there. In such case, in the absence of monopoly
conditions, the immediate victim cannot pass on his loss to the purchaser
of his wares or services, and it is he who is out of pocket.
This statement is diametrically opposed to the usual economic
analysis, which holds that in the absence of monopoly conditions such
costs, like taxes, must be passed on by the seller, and would be borne
by him only if monopoly were present. The confusion arises from the
common mistake of regarding our actual system as one of pure com-
petition, whereas in reality it is tinged with monopolistic elements.'
The theory of monopolistic competition outlined above provides us
with the correct attack on the problem. Each monopolistic compe-
titor, having an individual market demand curve, has the option of
selecting the price along that curve which, considering sales volumes
at that price and unit costs at that volume, will yield him the greatest
profit. This price need not be equal to average cost, since by definition
the enterprise is monopolistic to a degree,.depending on the degree of
consumer preference, and presents difficulties to anyone who might
otherwise, attracted by high profits, attempt to enter the same market.
It is quite possible for the seller of a product differentiated by trade
mark, location, or atmosphere, to continue operating above costs per-
manently, or as long as the consumer preference lasts.
This suggests that there is a fallacy in the popular belief that
the seller must pass the costs of racketeering along to the public
because he is operating at cost and cannot bear them himself. It is
possible and probable that the consumer is spared the cost of racketeer-
ing in some instances because the merchant bears it. The merchant
would bear the costs if the shape of his demand curve indicated
that an attempt to raise prices to cover the added cost would lower his
sales volume sufficiently to lower his total revenue by more than the
amount of the racketeer's tribute. The more cognizant of his best
interests the merchant, the more this would be true. This principle
would apply also for a whole industry. If the cleaners and dyers of
a particular city attempt to use a gunman-enforced price schedule
that is too high they will quickly discover that loss of sales volume to
substitutes will decrease their total revenue.
'sDorr and Simpson, op. cit., p. 410.
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This happened to the barbers and cleaners of Chicago. When
Chicago cleaners raised their price to $1.75 and more for cleaning
a suit of clothes they suffered such diminution of demand that ulti-
mately the racket broke. It is even conceivable that a racket would
lower prices in an industry, in two ways: (1) by increasing sales
volume for the smaller number of permitted enterprises, thus per-
mitting prices at a point of lower marginal cost; (2) by taking price-
fixing discretion out of the hands of many partial monopolies and
concentrating it in the hands of the broader monopoly, which, through
the hiring of expert advice, is better able to select the price of maxi-
mum returns in competition with other industries and substitutes.
A final comment may be made. Even in cases where the con-
sumer does pay the cost of racketeering, because of"the shape of the
demand curve, the matter is by no means ended there. If consumers
as a class pay more for this particular commodity, they have less to
spend for other commodities. In a sense, other industries really pay
for the cost of racketeering. More, a reallocation of economic re-
sources may be involved. The consumers who pay more to the
racket-ridden industry are not precisely the same as those who pre-
viously patronized it. Some, the marginal buyers, shift to substitutes
with the price rise; the substitute commodities are actually benefited
by racketeering. Tracing the numerous strands of social effect be-
comes an extremely difficult and complex proceeding. Enough has
perhaps been said to indicate that the problem is by no means so simple
that it can be dismissed by adding up the sums racketeers receive.
Much the same principles apply to other crimes commonly listed
in computations of the cost of crime. Loft robbery, truck hi-jacking,
etc., are properly regarded as constituting costs of the industries in-
volved. Usually the losses are made truly costs of the entire industry
by the device of spreading those losses over the entire group by
means of insurance. What is not recognized in such computations is
that the losses may not be borne by the consumers entirely, but to
some degree by the business men. Take the case of robbery of silk
from trucks or lofts. Certainly such loss raises the cost of silk to
the merchant. It does not, however, proportionately raise the price
of silk dresses sold by-a smart store or trademarked with a prestige
brand, if any part of the previous price had gone toward payment
for the atmosphere or prestige of the brand or store. The seller
would have previously fixed his price at the point which would give
him the greatest aggregate revenue. He would again do this. If his
demand curve were a straight line, the rise in price would be exactly
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half the increase in marginal cost. If marginal costs were constant,
which is not improbable for realistic volume ranges, the increase in
price would be exactly half 'the insurance cost per unit of sales.1 9
If marginal costs were decreasing, the price would increase more
than half the insurance costs. -If marginal costs were increasing, the
price would increase less -than half (the insurance costs. If the de-
mand curve were "not a. straight line, the effect of the crime cost in
raising price would be greater the more concave is the demand curve,
and less the more convex the, curve.
The simplest case, that of a straight demand curve and constant
marginal costs, may beillustrated with a chart.
-MC,
V M._ M,
AR represents average revenue; MR, marginal revenue; MC, the original
marginal cost and MC, the marginal cost increased by crime cost (or insurance)
of a constant amount per unit. In accordance with the principle of pricing atthe point at which MR=MC, MP, will be the original price and MP_ the price
resulting from the added cost burden. In this case the rise in price is half the
rise in marginal cost. It is assumed that the AR curve does not change.
Crime an-Integral Part of Economic System
Without in the least apologizing for crime as a moral phenomenon,
"
9For the .somewhat intricate geometrical proof of this statement, the reader
is referred to Robinson, Joan: Economics of Imperfect Competition, London,
1933; II, 5.
THE COST OF CRIME
we are forced to the conclusion that it is an industry like other indus-
tries, bound together in inextricable interdependence with all the
other institutions and activities by means of which man makes a
living. Sutherland has made some extraordinarily penetrating" com-
ments on "the pervasive nature of criminality"; he shows that crime
permeates the whole of our economic structure. 0 But even pro-
fessional and avowed crime is an integral part of the economic system.
As an industry, it gives direct employment to thousands of persons
who would otherwise be in competition in the labor market; indirectly,
it contributes to the financial welfare of those who supply it with
equipment and those who benefit by the spending of the spoils. Most
immediately, it supports the manufacturers and sellers of the weapons
and tools of criminals and policemen, the landlords who rent houses
of prostitution aod offices of private detective agencies, and a host
of others. More remotely, the most diverse and respectable indus-
tries are involved through our delicate interlocking exchange mechan-
ism. The automobile manufacturer, for example, need draw no dis-
tinction between cars that are wrecked by criminals, through careless-
ness or intent, or "stripped," for the parts, and those that wear out
in the normal duties of producing utilitfes for law-abiding citizens.
Wastes involved in crime are as useful from the producer's point of
view as legitimate consumption.
People depend upon crime for a living who do not realize what
they owe to the bootlegger and the pimp. The "decent elements" in
the community derive from the conditions that produce sordidness
and crime the income that enables them to struggle against sordidness
and crime just as the druggist's wife puts in the collection plate on
Sunday the quarter that bought the ginger ale fot someone's Saturday
night spree. Upon this paradox, reform movements have often
broken, for in proportion as reform movements succeed they "hurt
business," and in proportion' as they hurt business they lose support!
Nor is the opposition to reform solely a selfish action on the part of
the interests immediately affected. If it were somehow possible to
eliminate all crime suddenly, the effect on our entire economic struc-
ture would be as disastrous as the collapse of any other industry of
similar magnitude. The repercussion would be the same in kind, if
not in degree, as that which typically follows a great war.
It would be a false inference to conclude that efforts-to reduce
crime should be halted. Realistically, we know it to be extremely
improbable that the fight on crime could succeed completely and quickly
2Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 31-38.
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enough to cause serious dislocation of industry. This disrupting effect
is purely a phenomenon of the short run.. In the long run, no eco-
nomic system can prosper by, "making work." The "creation of pur-
chasing power" by unproductive work is fundamentally fallacious,
despite the widespread currency of the belief to the contrary. If crime
were suddenly to be eliminated, there would begin immediately a
shifting of the factors of production. The length and severity of the
period of readjustment would depend solely upon the degree of mo-
bility or immobility of those factors. For example, if safe-cracking
could be entirely prevented, manufacturers of safes would suffer a
loss of business, which would be spread to other industries because
of the decline in the personal incomes derived from the safe-manu-
facturing. But those who formerly purchased replacement safes
would be enabled to buy other goods in an equal amount, possibly from
the safe-manufacturers themselves if they shifted in appropriate fash-
ion. The net gain would lie -in the additional goods which would. be
bought instead of replacement safes.
Several of the credits on the economic balance-sheet of crime are
not purely short-run, but are more permanent in their nature. Activi-
ties that are legally criminal but economically productive of utility
must be regarded as credits even in the long-run view. So also must
the various crimes that involve savings of the wastes of natural re-
sources and of the other wastes caused by free competition. It is not
argued that these credits can be even approximately assessed, for
proper cancellation against the economic debts of crime. We can
measure some elements of the cost of particular crimes, but we cannot
measure the cost of crime.
The significant point to be emphasized by the present analysis is
that instead of attempting to discover the cost of crime, an enterprise
foredoomed to some absurdity, we need to study the economic effects
of crime. We need to know the nature and magnitude of the prob-
able immediate results of a crime crusade. We need to be more
cognizant of the permanent consequences of crime as an organic part
of our society. How does crime operate to introduce expensive goods
to new price classes? What is the effect of crime in redistributing
the national income? What unintended consequences for the larger
social order have such crimes as bank robbery, embezzlement, counter-
feiting, and racketeering? Who pays for goods that have been stolen
or destroyed; what problems of shifting and incidence appear? What
are the roots of crime in legitimate business? These, it seems to the
present writers, are some of the significant questions that arise from
a study of the cost of crime. It is within the power of the human
mind to answer them.
